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July 2025 Newsletter: When the Signals Flash Red

We were up 1.3% in July. We began the month unhedged¹ but have since fully re-hedged the portfolio. Although the market has moved higher since we put that protection in place, we currently find the balance of risk and reward to be one of the least attractive we’ve seen in some time. Markets can sometimes overshoot, and we believe that is what is happening now.

In the short term, it is notable that retail enthusiasm is at an exceptionally high level. In the US options market, 70% of all options being bought are call options – an almost record high. At the same time, the number of days that the Nasdaq has traded above its short-term moving average now exceeds even the levels seen during the 1999/2000 run-up. By contrast, corporate insiders appear far less optimistic: insider buying has fallen to a decade low.

In our view, the UK market is now very overbought – remarkably so across all time horizons, from short term to long term. This kind of broad-based overbought signal is rare, and when it occurs, the strength of the warning is about as strong as it gets. Based on our analysis, the UK market is now more overbought than at any point in at least the past 25 years – the full extent of our dataset.

Valuation metrics also paint a worrying picture. The Shiller cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio (CAPE) for the US market is currently above 38x. In more than a century of data, this level has only been exceeded at the very peak of the 1999/2000 tech bubble. Perhaps more important is that, based on historical outcomes at this valuation level, forward 10-year annualised equity returns are typically negative. Combining this with near-term signs of market froth makes for a poor risk/reward setup.

What’s particularly striking about today’s environment is the sheer scale of distortions and risks at play – among the most extreme we have seen. Much has been said about whether the current backdrop resembles the 1970s or the year 2000. In truth, it may be a combination of both. In the early 1970s, President Nixon pressured then–Fed Chair Arthur Burns to cut interest rates despite clear signs of inflation. Initially, equity markets responded positively. But once inflation surged, interest rates had to rise even more sharply, resulting in a devastating 50% bear market that ended in the mid-1970s. A similar scenario could unfold again – President Trump appears similarly determined to push interest rates lower, regardless of inflationary pressures.

Meanwhile, the level of speculation and excitement surrounding AI and the broader tech sector is extraordinary. Between the past few years and 2026, it is estimated that the US will spend $1.1 trillion on data centres—equivalent to around $12,000 per US household. It remains unclear how and when AI will begin to generate meaningful returns. For context, the entire US interstate highway system – built between 1919 and 1991 – cost roughly $600 billion in today’s dollars. There is a real risk that much of the current AI investment could represent a massive misallocation of capital, with the potential for significant disappointment. While AI may indeed prove to be transformative over time, it’s also possible that the sector will face a shakeout akin to the post-dot-com collapse. Amazon, for example, fell more than 80% between 2000 and 2001 before becoming the long-term success story it is today.

Finally, it is worth comparing today’s macroeconomic backdrop with those of the 1970s and 2000. In the 1970s, despite high inflation and social tension, US government debt stood at just 30–35% of GDP. Today, it is well over 100%. Valuations, too, were far lower. In 2000, the US was running a small budget surplus; today, it faces a deficit exceeding 6% of GDP. In many respects, the global economy is in a more precarious position now than it was during either of those past cycles. That reality stands in stark contrast to the currently elevated market valuations.

We will proceed with caution.

1 From time to time, the fund uses FTSE 100 equity futures to protect the value of the fund. When the hedge is applied, net equity exposure is reduced, and the capital should be largely protected.

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